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Abstract
In this paper a reconstruction of the theory of bargaining with claims in economic environ-
ments is addressed. The spirit of that reconstruction is similar to that of the standard bar-
gaining theory made by Roemer.
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Resumen. Negociación con derechos en entornos económicos
En este trabajo se aborda el problema de la reconstrucción de la teoría de negociación con
derechos en entornos económicos. El espíritu de la reconstrucción y las técnicas son seme-
jantes a las de Roemer para el problema clásico de negociación.
Palabras clave: entornos económicos, negociación, derechos.
1. Introduction
Chun & Thomson (1992) enriched the traditional model of axiomatic bargaining
(Nash (1950)), by adding to the disagreement point and the feasible set a third
element, the claims point, an unfeasible point which has to be taken into account
when proposing a solution to the conflict.
A problem of bargaining with claims is understood as the mathematical
abstraction of a physical bargaining problem in which the claims point plays the
role of founded expectations of the agents. Examples of such a type of situation
may be either bankruptcy-like problems, or arbitration problems in which agents'
(*) Thanks are due to Antonio Villar and María del Carmen Marco for helpful comments. My special
gratitude to John Roemer who supported wonderfully this work during my visit to the University
of California, Davis, in the winter of 1994. Financial support from the IVIE and the DGICYT,
project PB92-0342, are gratefully acknowledged.
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                           expectations correspond to previous agreements, environmental variables, etc.
Finding solutions to this type of problems entails providing with satisfactory
answers to the conflict at hand.
As in any arbitration scheme, two main ingredients are always present when
looking for satisfactory answers: efficiency and fairness. The traditional axiomatic
approach is particularly useful, since by means of a suitable combination of a small
group of nice criteria, a unique outcome is selected as the solution of each problem.
Despite the formal beauty of the axiomatic approach, it is not immune from
criticism. While the motivation for the bargaining with claims model is economic
(agents bargain over some kind of pie, with founded expectations on the result),
all the relevant economic information is sterilized out of the model, since it con-
centrates only on utility data. As a consequence, problems which have nothing to
do with each other in terms of their economic information (different utility func-
tions, different goods, different physical claims) collapse into the same data in
utility terms, and thus become indistinguishable. This fundamental difficulty is
particularly apparent if we take into account that individuals' perceptions of what
they consider as being just vary, depending upon the particular nature of the prob-
lem at hand (see Yaari & Bar-Hillel (1984)).
As in the case of bargaining theory, working on a domain of economic envi-
ronments is entirely different from using the domain of triples {S,d,c}, where S is
a convex, closed, comprehensive set (in ´ n), d is a point in S, and c is a point in
´
n
 outside S. Notice that some natural economic mechanisms are not mecha-
nisms in classical bargaining with claims theory. This is the case, for instance, for
the classical proportional to the claims division mechanism. It is interesting to
observe that, nevertheless,  properties (or axioms) in the classical bargaining with
claims framework, are justified in terms of some underlying economic environ-
ment situation, in order to motivate their rational or their fairness content. In con-
trast, those properties are much more demanding than intuition suggests.
The said difficulty is shared by both the traditional axiomatic bargaining and
the bargaining with claims approaches. In the case of classical bargaining, Roem-
er (1988) reconstructed the traditional axiomatic bargaining theory focusing on
economic environments. 
This paper explores the reconstruction of bargaining with claims theory tak-
ing economic environments as the domain of the allocation mechanism. Two
main questions arise: First, why it is considered to be an interesting exercise, and
second, whether or not the technical aspects of such an exercise are different from
that in Roemer (1988) for the classical bargaining theory.
In answer to the first question, the interest of the exercise derives from clari-
fying the limits of concentrating only on utility information in this particular case.
If the claims point is understood as indicating property rights, and the disagree-
ment point indicates that unless an agreement is reached the available resources
are thrown out, it may be that the classical bargaining with claims theory is clos-
est to its reconstruction from an economic environments perspective than is the
case for the classical bargaining theory.
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                                                                            As for the second question, some remarks are in order:
1. The literature on bargaining problems with claims was initiated by Chun &
Thomson (1992), meaning that it is still a novel topic. Somehow, we may
think of a bargaining with claims problem as an extension of both the classical
bargaining theory and the bankruptcy theory. This explains why there are two
different types of mechanisms analyzed so far: those adapted from the classi-
cal bargaining theory and those adapted from the bankruptcy literature.
2. The reconstruction of those mechanisms inspired in classical bargaining
mechanisms, such as the proportional solution (Chun & Thomson (1992)),
and the extended-claims egalitarian solution (Bossert (1993), Marco (1994),
(1995)) can be done by suitably adapting Roemer's techniques. Notice that
two main ingredients of these techniques are Billera & Bixby (1973) and
Howe (1987). As a consequence, we also need the commodity space to be of
unbounded dimension.
3. This is not the case for those mechanisms inspired in the bankruptcy model,
especially when minimal concession points are involved, as they are in Herre-
ro (1994), (1998). These solutions are out of the scope of this paper.
In Section 2 we present the set-up, as well as the main axioms used in the
aforementioned reconstruction of the theory. Section 3 presents characteriza-
tion results for a fixed number of agents. Section 4 is devoted to the correspond-
ing characterizations for a variable population. The proofs are relegated to an
Appendix.
2. The set-up
Let Uh be the set of all real valued monotone concave continuous functions
defined on . An economic environment is a tuple
 = < n , u , h , w , c >
where n, h ‡  1 are integer numbers, , , c = (c1,…,cn), such that
 for all i = 1,…,n, and u = (u1,…,un), where  for all i = 1,…,n.
The interpretation is that we deal with a problem involving n agents, each one
characterized by her utility function ui, having claims on h commodities ci, but
the available amounts of the commodities to be divided among them is w. If for
some j = 1,…,h, , then a conflict arises, which shall be called a conflict
of bargaining with claims. Agents may agree upon any feasible distribution of the
available commodities, otherwise they will end up with no goods at all. The ques-
tion is how to allocate w among the n individuals in the previous problem, name-
ly, to suggest an agreement.
We start by dealing with a family of problems in which n (the number of
agents) is fixed, but h (the number of goods to be distributed) varies. Let us call
´ +
h
x
w ´ +
h
˛ c ´ +
hn
˛
ci ´ +
h
˛ ui U
h
˛
cij
j 1=
n
å
wj>
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                                                                   å
n
 the class of all admissible environments for n agents. In this section, when
we specify an economic environment , no explicit mention to the number
of agents will be made, that is,  = < u , h , w , c > .
If , an allocation is a vector x = (x1, ... ,xn), where . Let us
denote u(x) = [u (x1),…,un(xn)]. Let Z  = { } be the set of feasible
allocations, and  the utility pos-
sibility set of . A  is a closed, comprehensive, convex set in , containing
the point u (0). Convexity comes from concavity of the utility functions; com-
prehensiveness and closedness come from free disposability of the goods and
continuity of the utility functions, respectively.
An allocation mechanism F is a correspondence which associates to each
economic environment , a set of feasible allocations. It will be assumed
that F induces a function in utility space, namely, if x, , then u(x) = u(y).
Call the induced utility function , where  is the set of
bundles which F assigns to every agent. Furthermore, it is assumed that F
chooses all the feasible allocations associated with a given point in the utility
space. Roemer (1988) call this type of correspondence a «full» correspondence.
Associated to any economic environment , we can define a classical
bargaining with claims problem in a natural way: If  = < u , h , w , c > , take
 as the feasible set, u (0) as the disagreement point and u (c) as the claims
point. Thus, we may look at  as a classical bargaining problem with claims. 
Two main ingredients are necessary in order to reconstruct the classical bar-
gaining with claims theory as a theory on economic environments: (1) To
ensure that the information contained in the utility possibilities set, the utilities
of the origin and the utilities of the claims point are all that are needed, (2) To
ensure that any triple (S,d,c), where S is a convex comprehensive subset of
 and  comes from a suitable economic environment
.
Point (2) is answered affirmatively by Billera & Bixby (1973), whenever
the commodities space is of unbounded dimension. In order to fulfill point (1),
we need the following axiom:
Axiom of Welfarism (W).— Let  = <u,h,w,c>, and  = <u' ,h' ,w' ,c '> be two
economic environments in  such that  =  , u (0) = u'(0) and
u (c) = u'(c'). Then, .
Axiom W says that an allocation mechanism F must treat identically (in terms
of utility) any two economic environments which have the same utility possibili-
ties set and in which the utility levels of the origin and of the claims point are
identical for all individuals. W is extremely strong, since it has to hold even in cir-
cumstances in which the dimension of the goods space is different. The welfarist
axiom is thus named because it requires the allocation mechanism to ignore all
x S
n
˛
x
x S
n
˛ xi ´ +
h
˛
x( ) x   x i
i
 
1=
 
n
 
å
 w £
A x( ) u1 … un, ,( ) ´ n   x $  Z x( )˛˛  u i x i ( ) u i ‡,{ } =
x x ( ) ´ n
x S
n
˛
y F x( )˛
íF x( ) u F x( )( )= F x( )
x S
n
˛
x
A x( )
x
´
n d S˛, c ´˛ n c Sˇ,
x S
n
˛
x x '
S
n A x( ) A x '( )
íF x( ) íF x '( )=
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information about an environment which is not summarized both in the utility
possibilities set and in the utilities of the disagreement and of the claims point.
In order to present the next axiom we need the concept of personal good.
Let  be an economic environment,  = <u,h,w,c>, i ˛  N, j ˛   {1,2,…,h}.
We shall say that good jth is a personal good for agent ith if for any k ˛  N, k „  i,
for any , and for any , if  stands for a vector in  having all
components equal to zero but the jth component, equal to Æ, we get that
uk (x) = .
Axiom of Consistency (CON). Let ,  = <u,h+h',(w,w'), (c,c')> be an envi-
ronment such that , where each of the y-goods (k = h+1,…h+h') is
a personal good for at most one of the agents. Define v by  vi(xi) = ui .
Consider now the environment   = <v ,h ,w ,c>. If , and ,
v(0) = u(0,0), v(c) = u(c,c'), then .
CON asks for a particular type of consistency in the allocation proce-
dure. First, the mechanism allocates those commodities which are only liked
by a particular agent (personal goods). Next, the remaining commodities are
allocated. The mechanism satisfies this property whenever the allocation is
immune to this two-step procedure. The interest of the axiom CON is that it
will imply the axiom of welfarism, even though it is an axiom relying on the
economic data of the problem.
The main result of this section is the next lemma, which is a straightforward
adaptation of Lemma 5 in Roemer (1988):
Lemma 1. CON and fullness of F imply W.
3. Bargaining with Claims and economic information with a fixed 
    number of agents
For any ,  = <u,h,w,c>, consider the sets of efficient and weakly effi-
cient allocations: PO  = , WPO  =
=  .
Now, consider the following axioms:
Axiom of Efficiency (PO). .
Axiom of Weak Efficiency (WPO). .
Axiom of Symmetry (SY). Let ,  = <u,h,w,c> be such that " i,j ˛  N, ui = uj, ,
ci = cj,. Then, (w/n,…,w/n) ˛ .
PO and WPO ask the solution allocations for different degrees of effi-
ciency. SY establishes that whenever we face identical individuals, then the
equal division of the available resources is a solution allocation.
Let ⁄n be the class of transformations ì: ´ n fi ´ n such that for any i ˛  N,
there exist a ai ˛  ´ ++, bi ˛  ´ , such that for all x ˛  ´ n , ìi(x) = aixi +bi . Let Tn be
the subclass of ⁄n with bi  = 0 for all i ˛  N.
x S
n
˛ x
x ´ +
h
˛ Æ 0‡ Æ j ´ h
uk x Æ
j+( )
x S
n
˛ x
x y,( ) F x( )˛
xi yi,( )
x ' x ' S
n
˛ A x( ) A x '( )=
x F x '( )˛
x S
n
˛ x
x( ) x Z x( )˛
   
u y
 
( )
 
u x
 
( )>
 
y Z
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x Z x( )˛
   
u y
 
( )
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u x
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Consider now the following axioms:
 
Axiom of Cardinality and Non Comparability (CNC).
 
 Let , .
 = <
 
u,h,w,c
 
>, = <
 
u',h,w,c
 
>, with 
 
u'
 
 = 
 
ì
 
u, 
 
. Then,  = .
 
Axiom of Ordinal Level Comparability (OLC). 
 
Let , ,  = <
 
u,h,w,c
 
>,
= <
 
u',h,w,c
 
>, with 
 
u
 
' = 
 
ô
 
u
 
, 
 
ô
 
 
 
˛
 
 T
 
n
 
. Then,  = .
CNC and OLC deal with two problems in which all the physical data are
identical and the only difference relies in the utilities. If these utilities are
related by allowed transformations, then the solutions must be identical. In
CNC the allowed transformations belong to 
 
⁄
 
n
 
, and therefore we are confined
to a universe in which utilities are cardinal and no interpersonal comparability
can be performed. Under OLC, the transformations belong to 
 
T
 
n
 
, and in con-
sequence, interpersonal comparability is possible, and utilities are ordinal.
These axioms play the role of Scale and Translation Invariance, respectively.
 
Axiom of Boundedness (BDD)
 
. For all ,  = <
 
u,h,w,c
 
>, 
 
u
 
(0) 
 
£
 
   
 
£
 
 
 
u
 
(
 
c
 
).
The previous axiom has the same meaning as in traditional bargaining
problems with claims. BDD requires that at any solution allocation no agent
is either better off than he is at the claims point or worse off than he is at the
disagreement point.
The axioms of consistency we present below are two different ways of
strengthening CON.
 
Axiom of Strong Consistency (CON*).
 
 Let ,  = <
 
u,h+h',
 
(w,w'),(c,c')> be
an environment such that , where each of the 
 
y
 
-goods
(
 
k
 
= h +1, …, h+h') is a personal good for at most one of the agents. Define v by
vi (xi ) = ui (xi , ). Consider now the environment = <u,h,w,c>. If ,
and v(0) = u(0,0), v(c) = u(c,c'), then .
Axiom of Rational Strong Consistency (RCON*). Let ,
 = <u,h+h',(w,w'),(c,c')> be an environment such that , where
each of the y-goods (k = h+1,…,h+h') is a personal good for at most one of the
agents. Define v by vi (xi ) = ui (xi, ). Consider now the environment
= <v,h,w,c>. If , and v(0) ‡  u(0,0), v(c) = u(c,c'), u  ‡  v(0), then
.
The axiom below is the version of the monotonicity axiom in economic envi-
ronments:
Axiom of Resource Monotonicity (R.MON). Let , , = <u ,h ,w ,c>,
= <u,h,w',c>, with w' ‡  w. Then  ‡   .
We can now define the Proportional Mechanism P in economic environ-
ments: For any , = <u,h,w,c>, P  = { u(x) = ìu(c) + (1–
ì)u(0), 0 £  ì £  1, x ˛  WPO }.
x x ' S
n
˛
x x ' ì ⁄n˛ F x( ) F x '( )
x x ' S
n
˛ x
x ' F x( ) F x '( )
x S
n
˛ x íF x( )
x ' S
n
˛ x
x y,( ) F x( )˛
yi x ' x ' S
n
˛
x F x '( )˛
x S
n
˛
x x y,( ) F x( )˛
yi
x ' x ' S
n
˛ x y,( )
x F x '( )˛
x x ' S
n
˛ x
x ' íF x '( ) íF x( )
x S
n
˛ x x ( ) x Z x( )˛
x( )
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For any , = <u,h,w,c>, E  = {  ui (ci) – ui (xi) = uj (cj) – uj (xj),
i, j = 1,…,n, x ˛ WPO }. Now, the Extended Claim-Egalitarian Mechanism EE, is
defined in the following way: For any , = <u,h,w,c>,
EE  = {  if for some i, j ˛ N, ui (ci) – ui (xi) > uj (cj) – uj (xj), thus
uj (xj) = 0, x ˛ WPO}.
By means of previous axioms the following characterization results are
obtained [see Appendix]:
Theorem 1. The proportional mechanism is the unique full mechanism in
å
n
 satisfying Weak Efficiency, Consistency, Resource Monotonicity, Symme-
try and Cardinality and Non Comparability.
Theorem 2. The extended claim-egalitarian mechanism is the unique full
mechanism in å n satisfying Weak Efficiency, Ordinal Level Comparability,
Strong Consistency, Resource Monotonicity, Symmetry and Boundedness.
4. Bargaining with Claims in economic environments with variable
    population
Let us consider now an infinite set of potential agents I = {1, 2,…}, such that only
a finite group of them are present in every concrete problem. Let M be the class of
finite subsets of I. For a given M ˛ M,  denotes the cartesian product of |M |
copies of  indexed by the elements of M. Let  be the class of economic envi-
ronments for |M | agents indexed by the elements of M. Let  From
now on, an economic environment is a tuple = <M, u, h, w, c>, where
M ˛ M, and the environment <u,h,w,c> ˛  , where m = |M |.
An allocation mechanism F is a full correspondence defined on  associating
to any economic environment  a set of feasible allocations.
Consider now the following axiom:
Axiom of Anonymity (AN). For all M, M', with |M | = |M'|, for any  ˛ , =
<u,h,w,c> and for any one to one mapping ç:M fi M', if  ˛ , is such that
= <ç(u),h,w,ç(c)>, then  iff ç(x) ˛ .
Axiom of Population Monotonicity (POP.MON). For any M,N ˛ M, for any
= <M, u, h, w, c> ˛ , = <N,u',h',w,c'> ˛ , if M Ì N, uM' = u, cM' = c,
then  ‡ .
Axiom of Continuity (CONT). For all N, for all sequence { }, ˛ ,
= <ut,h,wt,ct>, = <u,h,w,c> ˛ , if ut fi u in the pointwise convergence
topology, wt fi w, ct fi c in the Hausdorff topology, then  fi  in
the pointwise convergence topology.
x S
n
˛ x x ( ) x Z x( )˛
x S
n
˛ x
x( ) x Z x( )˛
´
M
´ S
M
S = S
M M˛
¨
M
x
S
m
S
x S˛
x S
M
x
x S
M'
x ' x F x( )˛ F x '( )
x S
M
x ' S
N
íF M x '( ) íF x( )
x
t
x
t
S
n
x
t
x S
n
íF x
t( ) íF x( )
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Theorem 3. The proportional mechanism is the unique full mechanism in
å  satisfying Weak Efficiency, Boundedness, Continuity, Anonymity, Cardi-
nality and non Comparability, Strong Consistency and Population Monoto-
nicity.
Theorem 4. The extended claim-egalitarian mechanism is the unique full
mechanism in å  satisfying Weak Efficiency, Boundedness, Continuity, Sym-
metry, Ordinal Level Comparability, Rational Strong Consistency and Pop-
ulation Monotonicity.
Appendix: Proofs of the Theorems
We shall prove that the right combination of axioms on economic environments
imply the corresponding counterparts in utility terms. Then, by using the charac-
terizations of the proportional and the extended claim-egalitarian solutions in the
classical setting, we obtain our characterization results.
For the sake of completeness, we include the definitions of the axioms in util-
ity terms as well as the characterization theorems in the classical setting. For an
environment = <u,h,w,c>, and a permutation ð of the set of agents, call
ð  = <ð (u),h,w,ð(c)>.
U-Symmetry (U-SY). Let  ˛  such that for any permutation ð :N fi N,
A( ) = A[ð( )]. Then, [ ]i = [ ]j , "  i,j ˛ N.
U-Anonymity (U-AN). For all M, M', with |M | = |M' |, for any  ˛ ,  ˛
=<u,h,w,c>, = <u',h',w',u'> and for any one to one mapping ç:M fi M',
if A( ) = ç[A( )], u'(0) = ç[u(0)], u'(c') = ç[u(c)], then  = ç[ ].
Scale Invariance (SC.INV). Let , ˛ . If  there exist   such that
z ˛  Z  iff , then,  = ì[ ].
Translation Invariance (T.INV). Let , ˛ . If there exist   such that
z ˛  Z  iff , then,  = ì[ ].
Strong Monotonicity (ST.MON). If  = <u,h,w,c>, = <u',h',w',c'> ˛   are
such that u(0) = u'(0), u(c) = u'(c'), A( ) Ì  A( ), then  ‡  .
For = <u,h,w,c>, call K( ) = {z ˛ WPO ( ) | u(0) £  u(z) £  u(c)}.
Independence of Pareto irrelevant, non-individually rational and unclaimed alter-
natives (IND). If , ˛  are such that A[K( )] = A[K( )], then
 = .
U-Continuity (U-CONT). For all N, for all sequence { }, ˛ , =<ut,h,wt,ct>,
= <u,h,w,c> ˛ , if A( ) fi A( ), \ ut(0) fi u(0) and u(ct) fi u(c), then
fi  where the convergences are taken in the Hausdorff topology.
For = <u,h,w,c> ˛ , call IR( ) ={z ˛ Z( ) | u(z) ‡  u(0)}.
x
x( )
x S
n
x x íF x( ) íF z( )
x S
M
x ' S
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x x '
x ' x íF x '( ) íF x( )
x x ' S
n ì ⁄n˛
x( ) ìz Z x '( )˛ íF x '( ) íF x( )
x x ' S
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x( ) ìz Z x '( )˛ íF x '( ) íF x( )
x x ' S
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x x ' íF x '( ) íF x( )
x x x
x x ' S
n
x x '
íF x( ) íF x '( )
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˛ , if A(IR( )) Ì  A(IR( )), u(c) = u'(c'), ˛ A(IR( ), then =
.
Fixed Claims Contraction Independence (FCCI). For any , ˛ , if
u(0) = u'(0), u(c) = u'(c'), A( ) Ì  A( ),  ˛ A( ), then = .
Let us consider a set of agents, N, and a subset of it, M. If x ˛ ´ N, let xM
be the projection of x onto ´ M, and given (S,d) such that S Ì  ´ N, d ˛ S, let
 (S) = { x ˛ ´ M | (x,dN/M ) ˛ S }.
U-Population Monotonicity (U-POP.MON). For all M,N, such that M Ì  N, for all
= <n,u,h,w,c> ˛ , = <m,u',h',w',c'> ˛ , if uM (0) = u'(0), uM (c) =
u'(c'), and [A( )] = A( ), then, for all i ˛ M, ui [F( )] £  u'i [F( )].
Chun & Thomson (1992), theorem 1, characterize the proportional solution in
utility terms by means of WPO, U-SY, SC.INV. and ST.MON.
Lemma 1. CON and fullness of F imply W.
Proof: Let , ˛ , = <u,h,w,c>, = <u',h',w',c'> such that
A( ) = A( ), u(0) = u'(0), u(c) = u'(c'). It must be proven that  = .
As in Roemer (1988, lemma 5), construct * = ˜ , * =
<v,h+h',(w,w'),(c,c')>, where vi (xi ,yi ) = min {ui (xi ), ui '(yi )}. By Billera &
Bixby (1973), A( *) = A( ) = A( ); v (0) = u (0) = u'(0). Furthermore,
v (c,c') = u (c) = u'(c').
It has to be proven that  =  and  = . The previous
result is obtained as in Roemer (1988, lemma 5), by means of a series of interme-
diate problems, suitably modified by adding the appropriate claims point to each
one, in order to maintain not only the equality of the utilities possibilities sets, but
also the utilities of the claims points.n
Lemma 2. Fullness, R.MON and CON imply ST.MON.
Proof: Let  = <u,h,w,c>, = <u',h',w',c'> such that u(0) = u'(0), u(c) = u'(c'),
and A( ) ˚  A( ). We have to show that  ‡  . Act as in Roemer
(1988, lemma 6), constructing the auxiliary problems, suitably modified by add-
ing the claims point in such a way that the utility of the claims points is always
preserved.n
In an immediate way we obtain:
Lemma 3. Fullness, W and SY imply U-SY.
Lemma 4. Fullness, CNC and W imply SC.INV.
Theorem 1 follows from Lemmas 1, 2, 3, 4, and theorem 1 in Chun & Thomson
(1992).
Bossert (1993), theorem 1, characterizes the extended claim-egalitarian solu-
tion by means of WPO, U-SY, T.INV., ST.MON, BDD and IND.
x
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íF x '( )
x x ' S
n
x x ' íF x '( ) x íF x( ) íF x '( )
tM
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x S
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x ' S
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u' 0( )
x x ' x x '
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Proof: Let us prove that IND follows. The other implication goes similarly.
1. Let  = <u, h, w, c>,  = <u',h',w',c'> such that u (c) = u'(c'), and
K ( ) ˝  K ( ). Let x' ˛  F( ) such that u'(x') ˛  K ( ). To prove:
 = .
2. Construct * =  ˜  . * = <v,h+h', (w,w'), (c,c')>, where vi (xi ,yi) =
min {ui (xi), ui '(yi)}. K( *) = K( ) ˙ K ( ) = K( ), and v(c,c') = u(c) = u'(c').
3. Consider now  = < ,h+h',(w,w'),(c,0)>, where (xi ,yi) = ui (xi), i = 1,... ,n.
Obviously, K( ) = K( ), u(c) = (c,0). 
4. Notice that (xi ,yi) ‡ vi (xi ,yi) for all i = 1,…,n. Now by Howe (1987,
Prop. 3), it is possible to find functions Ui : fi , such that
Ui (xi ,yi ,1) = (xi ,yi), Ui (xi ,yi ,0) = vi (xi ,yi). Now, construct the functions
Vi : fi , Vi(x,y,z) = Ui (x,y,zi), for z ˛ , i = 1,…,n.
5. Consider now the environment: z  = <V,h+h'+n,(w,w',1,…,1),(c,0, f)>,
where fi = ei , the ith vector of the canonical basis in . Thus, K(z ) = K( ) =
K( ). Moreover, Vi  (ci  ,0,ei) = Ui(ci  ,0,1) = (ci  ,0) = ci(ci ,ci').
6. Construct the environment * = <V,h+h'+n,(w,w',0); (c,c',0)>. Thus, K =
K( ). Moreover, V(ci  ,ci ',0) = Ui(ci , ci ',0) = vi  (ci  ,ci '). 
7. From previous constructions, A( ) = A(z ). Consider an allocation in F(z ),
zi = (xi ,yi ,ei). Then, there must be an allocation ti = (x'i,y'i,0) in Z( ), induc-
ing the same utility point, i.e., V(zi) = V(ti). Thus, since ti is feasible in z , and
because of fullness of F, t ˛ F(z ). 
Now, by CON*, (x'i,y'i)i=1,…,n˛ F( *), obtaining that ( *)= (z ). And
therefore ( *) = ( ).n
Lemma 6.- OLC, W and fullness imply T.INV.
Theorem 2 follows from lemmas 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and theorem 1 in Bossert (1993).
Chun & Thomson (1992), theorem 6, characterize the proportional solution
for a variable population by means of WPO, BDD, U-CONT, U-AN, SC.INV,
FCCI and U-POP.MON. Marco (1995), theorem 1 characterizes the extended
claim-egalitarian solution for a variable population by means of WPO, U-SY,
T.INV., U-CONT., BDD, RCIC and U-POP.MON.
In a similar way to previous lemmas we obtain now:
Lemma 7. Fullness of F, W and POP.MON imply U-POP.MON.
Lemma 8. Fullness of F, W and RCON* imply RCIC.
Lemma 9. Fullness of F, W and CONT. imply U-CONT.
x x '
x x ' x ' x
íF x( ) íF x '( )
x x x ' x
x x x ' x
x u ui
x x u
ui
´
h h' 1+ +
´
ui
´
h h' n+ +
´ ´
n
´
n
x
x ui
x x
*( )
x
*
x
*
x
*
x íF x íF
íF x íF x
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Theorem 3 follows from lemmas 1, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10 and theorem 6 in Chun & Thom-
son (1992). Theorem 4 follows from lemmas 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9 and theorem 1 in
Marco (1995).
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